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Abstract
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville narrates 19th century 
American life. He looks at American society, culture, and psychological 
mannerisms, and extracts from it the habits of everyday life. These become 
for Tocqueville the dynamic building blocks of democratic life for the 
Americans. Chief among these principles is the desire for political freedom; 
Tocqueville knows that this desire to participate for political freedom must 
rest on solid foundations—namely, the cultivation of community, self-
sacrifice, and ultimately a robust conception of the good. This paper has 
three main goals: First, to show what Tocqueville sees to be, in Democracy in
America, the function of religion in democracy. I will argue that Tocqueville 
thinks religion is necessary for a healthy democracy to function properly, 
which is to say that a healthy democracy works insofar as there is work done
to it by religion. To elaborate this claim, I will identify three ways in which 
religion functions in Tocqueville’s analysis: (1) it provides a foundation for 
political freedom, (2) it gives rise to mores, and (3) it focuses our attention 
on the good. In painting Tocqueville’s picture of political freedom, I will argue
that for Tocqueville, political freedom not only can but must form an alliance 
with religion if the two are to function well. I will then demonstrate how 
Tocqueville’s proposed view of democracy, religion, and freedom have 
implications for the modern age in issues that arise in a liberal modernity. My
thesis hones in on religion’s third function in Tocqueville’s analysis—namely, 
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that it focuses our attention on the good. Finally, I will consider how religion 
does indeed focus us on the good, arguing that political deliberation is not 
neutral. Rather, we each carry a set of values that help us to arrive at a 
conception of the good. 
Equality as Democracy: Descriptive and Normative
To start, I want to sketch out Tocqueville’s vision of equality. Doing so 
will be important for understanding why Tocqueville thinks a healthy 
democracy is in need of religion. Tocqueville opens his work by defining what
he means by democracy. He describes it as the historical process and 
development of the “equality of conditions.”1 Simple enough, it seems. But 
what does equality mean for Tocqueville? For Tocqueville, equality is defined
as social, economic, and political mobility. In fact, equality is the erosion of 
the ancient hereditary power: the aristocracy. Thus, Tocqueville captures two
components of equality: (a) a positive one (i.e. mobility) and (b) a negative 
one (i.e. the erosion of aristocracy). He writes that “conditions are more 
equal among Christians2 in our day than they have ever been in any time or 
any country in the world…”3 
This move toward democracy is brought about by Providence, so it is 
inevitable. Note that Tocqueville declares that democracy is a “providential 
fact.” It is a trend that began 700 years ago, and that only in his time has 
come to view as providential in the one country, America, that has adopted it
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba 
Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 3.
2 i.e. those in America.
3 Ibid., 6.
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and applied it fully. Listen to how Tocqueville explicates this claim about 
democracy being predestined:
The gradual development of equality of conditions is therefore a 
providential fact, and it has the principal characteristics of one: it is 
universal, it is enduring, each day it escapes human power; all events, 
like all men, serve its development.4
To call it providential means to deny it is human choice or discovery. 
Here, Tocqueville suggests that Providence has created a condition that has 
escaped human agency. Tocqueville does not begin with abstract notions of 
the state of nature—like his liberal contemporaries—but instead begins with 
history. One may wonder how exactly this equality of conditions manifests 
itself in reality given the fact that it has been determined by Providence. If it 
is universal, then this may mean it will occur everywhere inevitably. If it is 
served by all men, then this could mean that men are positioned in such a 
way to bring it into existence. These conditional statements raise several 
questions about the mechanisms and outplaying of democracy. For if 
democracy is universal, must there be a set formula for bringing it into 
existence? And if democracy is served by all men, must there be certain 
conditions that allow it to flourish? Further, does Tocqueville’s analysis of 
democracy in America carry with it a set of claims—maybe these are 
normative claims—not only about what makes democracy work per se, but 
what makes a healthy one work? Moreover, if Tocqueville is doing more than 
merely describing the progress of history, might we be able to unpack his 
4 Ibid.
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views about the way political life ought to be structured? Can we see 
Tocqueville as suggesting that the move toward democracy is legitimate?5
 To consider this last question, note that Tocqueville thinks that, “[i]t is
not the use of power or the habit of obedience that depraves men, but the 
use of power that they consider illegitimate, and obedience to a power they 
regard as usurped and oppressive.”6 Tocqueville here is making either a 
sociological or a psychological observation, which are both descriptive. But in
addition to making a descriptive claim, is he also making a normative one? 
Tocqueville’s analysis in this quote is important for his theory of 
democracy in at least two respects. In one sense, Tocqueville might be seen 
as providing a normative view of power—namely that power can corrupt. But
this picture is quite complicated, because it seems like Tocqueville is talking 
about people’s perception of power. He proposes a conception of power that 
is relational; our perception of it may determine whether or not we think it is 
legitimate. It is not simply power in itself that ‘depraves men,’ but rather it is
a power that men consider ‘illegitimate’ that depraves them. The tone that is
conveyed by the word depraved implies a sense of immoralism. 
One may also read Tocqueville as making a claim about what just 
political power looks like. Consider the role power plays in Tocqueville’s 
theory of democracy to see why this is so. What Tocqueville is inserting in his
5 It seems important to me to define what I mean by legitimate. Legitimacy refers to the 
right and acceptance of an authority, in particular political authority. Here, political authority
is associated with democracy. I understand Tocqueville as looking at legitimacy in two ways:
a normative one (something is legitimate because of some normative criterion, regardless of
whether people think it is legitimate) with a Weberian sociological one (something is 
legitimate insofar as people think it is legitimate). Therefore, something is legitimate only if 
it is consistent with a given standard and only if people accept it.
6 Ibid., 8.
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view of power is a component of morality, or that perceptions of it have a 
moral component. That power, considered illegitimate, can deprave man 
surely rests upon a notion of what people think power should not do. Hence, 
the assertion is not merely descriptive. It is also prescriptive. With this in 
mind, let’s expand a little more on how Tocqueville’s conception of equality 
fits in with democracy.
One aspect of Tocqueville’s understanding of equality is spelled out 
quite eloquently on page 52. It reads:
There is in fact a manly and legitimate passion for equality that incites 
men to want all to be strong and esteemed. This passion tends to 
elevate the small to the rank of the great; but one also encounters a 
depraved taste for equality in the human heart that brings to the weak 
and to want to draw the strong to their level that reduces men to 
preferring equality in servitude to inequality in freedom … but nothing 
can satisfy them without equality, and they would sooner consent to 
perish than to lose it. 7
The passion for equality is seen in a two-fold light: both positively and 
negatively. Notice the distinction that Tocqueville makes between the strong 
and the weak. The first claim is the positive one; namely that our passion to 
pursue equality can drive all to want to be strong and esteemed. Another 
claim, seen in a more negative light, suggests that our passion to pursue 
equality is dangerous if left untamed. Another claim, which could be called a 
neutral reading of the passage, would assert that our passion to pursue 
equality is a natural desire, inherent in the human individual. Note the 
‘depraved taste for equality’ that Tocqueville uses to describe this event. 
Perhaps Tocqueville would be satisfied with our second reading of the 
7 Ibid., 52.
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passage, since the term ‘depraved’ carries such a strong and ardent tone 
with it. Both readings may be consistent with one another, depending on 
how we do the interpretive work.
Additionally, notice the contrasting diction Tocqueville employs in this 
passage. The contrast between the strong and the weak parallels the 
contrast with the small and the great. The words ‘elevate’ and ‘level’ suggest
an almost hierarchical structure coupled with ‘freedom’ and ‘equality.’ The 
effect that Tocqueville’s language has on the reader is to read his claims as 
dualities, like black and white. Thus, Tocqueville could be issuing us a 
warning about the love of equality. Communicated as the claim that the 
desire for equality can lead the ordinary to pursue greatness, this statement 
may be considered a warning by virtue of the fact that this second drive is 
considered ‘depraved.’8 The drive toward equality has two feasible routes, 
and the way these routes are actualized is contingent upon how the desire 
for equality is satisfied.
If democracy is the equalizing of conditions, then the drive toward 
equality can lead in various directions—in this case either to a legitimate and
healthy democracy or to a depraved and unhealthy one. 
If democracy is not legitimate just because it is a historical, 
providential fact, then how does Tocqueville think we can ensure that we 
move to a legitimate form of democracy instead of a depraved one? For 
Tocqueville, does democracy require a certain type of people to keep it 
8 Another reading of this passage may call into question what Tocqueville means by his 
claim that “nothing can satisfy them without equality.” 
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functioning well? Indeed, while democracy is shaped particularly to fit within 
a certain culture, contextual landscape, it itself is shaped and determined by 
the people who make it. Thus, this may be why Tocqueville thinks that 
democracy must be taken care of diligently. He makes this point lucid when 
he writes:
Thus organized, the social body could have stability, power, and above 
all, glory. But now ranks are confused; the barriers raised among men 
are lowered; estates are divided, power is partitioned…9 
The word ‘could’ is doing a lot of work in the first sentence. Written in 
the subjunctive mood, the ‘could’ here is expressing possibility, as if stability,
power, and glory are all desirable variables. The second sentence describes 
the outcomes that have transpired due to the advent of democracy—all of 
this to say that there are both positive and negative consequences that have
been produced by it. The ‘ranks’—are now ‘confused’— refer to the social 
classes that existed under the aristocracy. This is playing itself out as the 
‘barriers’ are lowered. This lowering of barriers is not just evidence of 
increasingly political equality, but also of social and economic equality, since 
the divided states indicate an economic system that is becoming more and 
more mobile. As ‘power is partitioned’ there is a division and erosion of 
political, social, and economic power. 
Is this outcome something Tocqueville was afraid of? Perhaps, but 
Tocqueville goes on to present a picture of his ideal society:
I conceive a society, then, which all, regarding the law as their work, 
would love and submit to without trouble; in which the authority of 
9 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 8. 
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government is respected as necessary, not divine, and the love would 
bear for a head of state would not be a passion, but a reasoned and 
tranquil sentiment. Each having rights and being assured of preserving
his rights, a manly confidence and a sort of reciprocal condescension 
between the classes would be established, as far from haughtiness as 
from baseness.10
How does Tocqueville’s ideal society, conceptualized as it is above, 
become a reality? Tocqueville reveals to us how so in the passage itself. All 
political citizens view themselves as legislators and makers of the law, which
is why they do not mind submitting to it. The love for state and society has 
been reflected upon and thought about deeply. There must be a worldly 
reverence for authority, which is instructed rather than passionate. Citizens 
are right-bearers. There must be harmony between classes, which is made 
stable by ‘reciprocal condescension.’ In Tocqueville’s idealized society, the 
“social body will not be immobile; but the movements of the social body can 
be regular and progressive; if one encounters less brilliance than within an 
aristocracy, one will find less misery, enjoyments will be less extreme and 
well-being more general; sciences less great and ignorance rarer; 
sentimentals less energetic and habits milder; one will note more vices and 
fewer crimes.”11
With this thought in mind, let us now move onto the sort of thing that 
religion is for Tocqueville. 
Value of Religion: Truth or Utility?
10 Ibid., 9.
11 Ibid.
8
A proper understanding of Tocqueville’s definition of religion is 
important for thinking about the way it is supposed to function in his theory 
of democracy. First, let’s explore the importance of religion to a non-
depraved democracy.
Consider that for Tocqueville, not all religions are good for democracy. 
Tocqueville’s thinking on this subject seems to suggest that there are certain
kinds of religions that will and will not work well with democracy. One way of 
thinking about this is to say that religion, if it is to work out as 
conceptualized by Tocqueville, must cohere and harmonize with democracy. 
In effect, Tocqueville holds that certain religions cannot do this.
In comparing two different religions, Islam and Christianity, Tocqueville
writes:
That alone, among a thousand other reasons, is enough to show that 
the first of these two religions cannot dominate for long in enlightened 
and democratic times, whereas the second is destined to reign in these
centuries as in all the others.12
His assertion that Islam cannot be the religion for democracy is 
developed by looking at Islam’s teachings and creeds. By claiming that Islam
decrees specific rules and norms about political life, Tocqueville asserts that 
it cannot mix in well with a theory of democracy that posits freedom as one 
of its highest priorities. That there exists a conflict between an adherence  to
Islam and a desire for freedom is evident in the political-orientated doctrine 
that emanates from it. For if the political realm is to be concerned with 
freedom, the people who make up that political realm must be free to create 
12 Ibid., 420.
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and organize their own communities.13 Christianity works for Tocqueville 
because it speaks only “of the general relations of men to God and among 
themselves.”14 Christianity is broad enough—it does not prescribe definite 
articles of dogma concerning political life—to be a viable option. Islam, on 
the other hand, has “political maxims, civil and criminal laws, and scientific 
theories.”15 It does too much for Tocqueville.
Maybe democracy favors simplicity. And maybe this is because 
democratic peoples prefer systems that are parsimonious; systems that can 
account for a lot of things and do a lot of work with very little. And maybe a 
religion like Christianity is such a system. Islam does not distinguish between
the political and the religious; it is non-Erastian.
If we take this principle and apply it to our current discussion, then 
perhaps a religion that does not embrace a certain political order will work 
for democracy. Tocqueville is not making an epistemic claim about the 
truthfulness of any particular religion. Rather, bracketing the question of 
truth, he sees religion in instrumental terms, looking at its utility rather than 
its validity. In this sense, Tocqueville cares about the use of religion in 
democracy, not its truth. At the same time that he doesn’t think that all 
religions are instrumentally valuable to democracy, Tocqueville thinks each 
is nonetheless valuable in some way:
13 This thought is captured later on in the paper. See Function IV: Religion as the Source of 
Mores and The Good
14 Ibid., 419.
15 Ibid.
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Nor is there any [religion] that does not impose on each some duties 
toward the human species or in common with it, and that does not thus
draw him, from time to time, away from contemplation of himself.16
The turning from inwardness to outwardness is a recurring theme 
Tocqueville believes to be found in religion. What does it mean to look 
outward? Looking outward means turning It is not clear that, for Tocqueville, 
religion is the only tool that can do this—or whether it is the best. But the 
important point to take away from this discussion is that it is an important 
function for ensuring a healthy democracy. Now let’s move onto the real 
work religion does in democracy, by exploring its first function.
Function I: Religion as the Mediator between the Political Bond and 
the Moral Bond
Recall that Tocqueville’s analysis of religion in America is multifaceted.
What it does for democracy in America is integral. We have so far seen that 
Tocqueville wants a certain type of religion, but what exactly is it? For one, 
Tocqueville thinks that religion, or the state of religious faith, is natural to 
man. He writes, “Disbelief is an accident; faith alone is the permanent state 
of humanity.”17 In fact, “religion is only a particular form of hope, and it is as 
natural to the human heart as hope itself.”18 What Tocqueville is trying to say
here is that to attempt to throw off religion altogether is folly, because it is 
special to human nature. Tocqueville may be making a psychological claim—
that the hope of immorality found in religion is what man seeks. But can 
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 284.
18 Ibid.
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religious hopes find any place in democratic deliberation? The answer will be 
provided by looking at the relationship between psychology and religion.
Tocqueville considers religion and its place in democracy in the 
following passage:
Despotism can do without faith, but freedom cannot. Religion is much 
more necessary in the republic they extol than in the monarchy they 
attack, and in democratic republics more than all others. How could 
society fail to perish if, while the political bond is relaxed, the moral 
bond were not tightened? And what makes a people master of itself if 
it has not submitted to God?19
We begin to see why Tocqueville thinks religion is indeed ‘necessary’ 
for both freedom and democracy. He starts by contrasting religion in a 
democracy to religion in a monarchy, and claims that religion is ‘more 
necessary’ in a democratic republic than in any other political system. 
Religion is more necessary for securing the health of a democracy. 
The questions that follow Tocqueville’s statement are rhetorical and 
illuminate the dichotomy between the ‘political bond’ and the ‘moral bond.’ 
The equalizing of conditions in America are the driver for the ‘relaxing of 
political bonds.’ Such political bonds refer to those that existed under the 
aristocracy, and could refer to things like authority and hierarchy. In an age 
where conditions are equalized, Tocqueville thinks that the tight political 
bonds (i.e. the aristocracy and hierarchy) that were instituted by the 
aristocracy have become weakened. This would make sense in this context, 
if we were to read the “monarchy they attack” as referring to the political 
bond. 
19 Ibid., 282.
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Tocqueville’s conviction is that “[r]eligion, which, among Americans, 
never mixes directly in the government of society, should therefore be 
considered as the first of their political institutions; for if it does not give 
them the taste for freedom, it singularly facilities their use of it.”20 Granted, 
one may interpret Tocqueville here as saying that religion is the first political
institution because it is that which foundationally grounds freedom. In fact, 
this is where the moral bonds come into sight: it is religion—the moral bond
—that facilitates the American’s use of freedom. The word facilitate, as used 
above, suggests direction and guidance. In other words, religion facilitates—
it guides and directs—the use of freedom by telling us how to use it. It may 
even strengthen the moral bond in doing so.
How exactly does this look like in practice? In a democracy, where the 
political bonds are loosened, one might say that uncertainty reigns in the 
political world. Religion, then, tightens the moral bonds by placing the 
individual’s eyes on the certainty of the moral world. Uncertainty, in 
Tocqueville’s estimation, could mean that nothing is supremely guaranteed. 
Chief among this is the uncertainty about the political world, where distress 
and worry may be its very building blocks. The certainty of the moral world 
may remedy these undesirable consequences, because the certainty of the 
moral world comforts the democratic man. How so? For one, the moral world
—with its religious ideology—may state that there exists an afterlife, which 
could also refer to the idea that the soul is immortal. What should be taken 
20 Ibid., 280.
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here is that in some way religion places the individuals’ eyes toward some 
firm, unyielding truths that supersede this life, and which thereby guide how 
freedom is to be played out in political life. It tells man that his actions on 
this life matter—that they have consequences. The notion that freedom 
could be misused is perhaps what religion can teach.21
If freedom needs religion to facilitate it, what kind of thing is freedom? 
To understand this question, we must become acquainted with how 
Tocqueville sees the vices of egoism and individualism, both birthed out by 
despotism. Here Tocqueville expresses this sentiment:
Despotism, which in its nature is fearful, sees the most certain 
guarantee of its own duration in the isolation of men, and it ordinarily 
puts all its care into isolating them. There is no vice of the human heart
that agrees with it as much as selfishness…22 
Tocqueville suggests that despotism can give rise to individualism. For 
Tocqueville, individualism meant not self-assertion but self-withdrawal. It 
was defined as “a reflective and peaceable sentiment that disposes each 
citizen to isolate himself from the mass of those like him and to withdraw to 
one side with his family and his friends, so that after having thus created a 
little society for his own use, he willingly abandons society at large to 
itself.”23 Despotism sustains itself and thrives off of the ‘isolation of men.’ It 
isolates men and gives birth to uncontrolled forms of individualism, which 
turn participants of political life inward. In doing so, it thereby intensifies 
their isolation and makes care and protection for their self-interest all the 
21 For instance, using freedom for satisfying mere pleasure—for utility maximizing— instead
of living, in the words of Socrates, “an examined life.”
22 Ibid., 485.
23 Ibid., 482.
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more. In fact, it produces disconnection and generates a view of political life 
that sees society as composed of archipelagos—a scattered bunch of 
individuals who exist to secure their own piece of land. This in turn, 
according to Tocqueville, creates an ethos of ‘selfishness,’ where selfishness 
is a “passionate and exaggerate[d] love of self that brings man to relate 
everything to himself alone and to prefer himself to everything.”24 It makes 
man into a self-sufficient being who is wholly independent and self-reliant.
What this does, then, is shatter the social bond, or what can be called 
the social fabric, and takes away care for the common interest and for the 
future. It institutes civic apathy, where political life is alienated from its rich 
dimension of discourse to a vexatious distraction for the scramble for self-
interest. The public purpose is displaced by this ethos of self-interest; in fact,
Tocqueville worries about an ethos excessive self-interest—i.e., untempered 
by interest in the common good. Not only does individualism intensify this 
predicament, but it focuses the citizen exclusively on the here and now. It 
does so not only because “democracy make[s] each man forget his 
ancestors, but it [also] hides his descendant from him and separates him 
from his contemporaries; it constantly lead him back toward himself alone 
and threatens finally to confine him whole in the solitude of his own heart.”25
Such an occurrence undermines the ability for citizens to sustain civic 
participation, which is crucial for the maintenance of a healthy democracy. 
For if civic participation depends on a care for the well-being of others, 
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 484.
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individuals must learn “self-interest properly understood.” All the same, this 
formulation of civic participation is closely related to what Tocqueville’s 
conception of political freedom is all about. The augmentation of 
individualism breaks peoples ties to one another, to the web of social 
connections that supported them, and deprives them of the sustenance of 
political action. The worry that individualism becomes for Tocqueville, then, 
is that it finds its origin in democracy, and “it threatens to develop as 
conditions become equal.”26
Here discussion of Tocqueville’s “self-interest properly understood” is 
apt. Aware of the danger wrought out by the isolation and selfishness of 
individualism seen above, Tocqueville observed that Americans adopted the 
idea of “self-interest well understood.” The idea goes something like this: 
Each individual could further their interest most productively if they were to 
redirect their view from themselves toward the good of the community, 
which would inculcate a culture of unity, collaboration, and cooperation. This 
could be achieved through the disciplinary influence exerted by society on its
members—an influence embodied in the mores and in laws and institutions. 
Tocqueville details what this would look like in the following short passage:
The doctrine of self-interest well understood does not produce great 
devotion; but it suggests little sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot 
make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude of citizens who are 
regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves; 
and if it does not lead directly to virtue through will, it brings them 
near to it insensibly through habits.27 
26 Ibid., 483.
27 Ibid., 502.
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This practice—of the individual turning himself from inward to outward
—is not an easy task. In fact, Tocqueville asserted that it requires “little 
sacrifices.” Public involvement would remove the mistaken feeling of self-
interest—a claim about countering unwanted selfish desires. What this does 
is create certain type of citizens—citizens who are ‘regulated, temperate, 
moderate, and farsighted’—which is important for Tocqueville’s theory of 
democracy. Tocqueville insists that this doctrine must be—perhaps only be—
vitalized by religion.
 He argues, “If this doctrine of self-interest well understood had only 
this world in view, it would be far from sufficient; for there are a great 
number of sacrifices that can find their recompense only in the other 
world.”28 His assertion that religious belief teaches men that they will be 
rewarded in the next life is important for giving men the credence to make 
the sacrifices that are demanded of them now. The religious claim that there 
awaits rewards and punishments in the afterlife tells men that their sacrifices
are worth it. Important as it is for cultivating a philosophy of public-
spiritedness, this mechanism additionally gives individuals the assurance 
that what they do on this side of reality has ramifications for the present and 
for the future. Religion can even give the self-interested individual a 
community in attempts to counter the isolation that may be produced with 
the advent of democracy.
28 Ibid., 504
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 In sum, Tocqueville suggests that religion works to guide freedom by 
focusing the individual’s attention on the certainty of the moral world. 
Religion guides freedom not just by focusing the individual on the certainty 
of the moral world, but also on directing him toward the common good. Let's 
now move onto religion’s second function, which is all about how religion 
grounds freedom. 
Function II: Religion as the Foundation of Freedom
Freedom and religion need not be separated, at least according to 
Tocqueville. In fact, religion and freedom are conjoined in America at the 
time he writes. He states:
Among us, I had seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom 
almost always move in contrary directions. Here I found them united 
intimately with one another: they reigned together on the same soil.29 
Tocqueville here is merely describing their harmonies and co-existence
together. He hasn’t yet made any claim about any relationship between 
them. But he continues:
If the human mind undertook to examine and judge individually all the 
particular cases that strike it, it would soon be lost in the midst of the 
immensity of detail and would no longer see anything.30
The statement asserted here is that it is not possible for an individual 
to form all of their beliefs on the basis of their own thinking; for if they did, 
they would not be able to ‘see anything.’ The idea conveyed by Tocqueville, 
in my estimation, is a foundationalist one. Foundationalism postulates that 
one’s beliefs and knowledge are structured in a hierarchical manner, 
29 Ibid., 282.
30 Ibid., 411.
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whereby those deemed most properly basic are located at the foundation.31 
These foundational beliefs are taken for granted, which means they cannot 
be empirically verified, and, as such, are the basis for all other claims to 
knowledge. What Tocqueville is asserting is that if everyone were to examine
and scrutinize every belief they had, knowledge of anything would be 
impossible. Tocqueville says that 
One cannot see a multitude of particular facts separately without 
finally discovering the common bond that brings them together … The 
habit of and taste for general ideas will therefore always be the greater
in a people as its enlightenment is more ancient and more manifold.32
What is this common bond that brings them together? Perhaps this is 
where religion comes in; it supports those beliefs that cannot be tested 
empirically, those located at the foundation. Religion itself is not based on 
any empirical set of claims about the world. Religion could be, but its very 
nature is the opposite of that of empiricism. The nature of religious belief is 
just that: belief. Where I think Tocqueville is going here is grounding thought 
itself in the similar way that religious belief does. Because a big portion of 
our knowledge rests on unscrutinized foundations, we may say that they rest
on religious holdings in the same manner. This formulation is important for 
civic participation in a democracy, given that collaboration between citizens 
require that there be communication among each other. In fact, it may be 
31 Foundationalism is associated with epistemology, which is the philosophical branch 
concerned with what we know and how we know it. I find that Tocqueville’s epistemology 
greatly influences his political philosophy, and though much can be said here, it would be 
worthwhile, sometime else, to explore in more detail the relationship between the two.
32 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 411.
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where religion grounds freedom, if we understand freedom to be political 
freedom.
Another reading of this passage may bring into view the significance of
shared beliefs—beliefs that are not ‘examine[d] and judge[d] individually.’ 
This is where the communication between citizens comes into view. These 
shared beliefs are deemed integral in Tocqueville’s theory of democracy, 
because civic participation requires that its citizens have a ‘common 
language’ they can use to speak to one another. This reading finds support 
in another passage, where he says:
[F]or without common ideas there is no common action, and without 
common action men still exist, but a social body does not. Thus in 
order that there be a society, and all the more, that this society 
prosper; it is necessary that all the minds of the citizens always be 
brought and held together by some principal ideas…33  
 So what individuals in political life are left to do is accept “as given a 
host of facts and opinions that he has neither the leisure nor the power to 
examine and verify by himself, but that the more able have found or the 
crowd adopts.”34 Tocqueville holds that a society requires that there be 
‘some principal ideas’ that hold it together. These principal ideas could be on
the topics of morality, right human conduct, obligations, and duties. 
But where exactly do these ‘principal ideas’ derive from? Religion, 
thinks Tocqueville, is the source.
Tocqueville praises how religion offers society a binding, moral ethic. 
And this is where his foundationalist insight comes into view. When he writes
33 Ibid., 407.
34 Ibid., 408.
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that men have inherited a certain ethical code, he maintains his claim that 
they are ‘very fixed ideas.’ He states that “[m]en therefore have an immense
interest in making very fixed ideas for themselves about God; their souls, 
their general duties toward their Creator and those like them.”35 
These ‘general duties’ must stem from somewhere; for Tocqueville, 
they find their source in religion (the ‘God’ mentioned here). Tocqueville 
notices that the human mind is limited. One individual alone is incapable of 
generating communal and binding moral precepts using their own intellect. It
is because of this fact that he states that certain “[g]eneral ideas relative to 
God and human nature are, therefore, among all ideas, the ones most fitting 
to shield from the habitual action of individual reason and for which there is 
most to gain and least to lose in recognizing authority.”36 Derivative from 
religion, the ability to act in political life demands some order and stability. 
The weakness of the “habitual action of individual reason” and the strength 
needed by political participation require that religious affairs not be just 
private matters, but must also become public matters. In the absence of this 
work done by religion, citizens may become passive creatures, those types 
of creatures antithetical to the maintenance of a healthy democracy.
Tocqueville thinks that common beliefs, specifically in relation to 
morality, are paramount to the wellbeing of a democratic populace. Morality 
is understood to be something that is concerned with how individuals 
interact and treat one another in society. A religious edifice is crucial to 
35 Ibid., 417.
36 Ibid., 418.
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maintain, for tearing it down brings about dire consequences. “When religion
is destroyed in a people,” Tocqueville claims, “doubt takes hold of the 
highest portions of the intellect and half paralyzes all the others.” Because of
this, each individual adopts “confused and changing notions about matters 
that most interest those life him and himself.”37 Tocqueville follows this by 
asserting a grave statement, that “one is reduced, like a coward, to not 
thinking about them at all.”38 “Such a state,” Tocqueville finishes, “cannot 
fail to enervate souls; it slackens the springs of the will and prepares citizens
for servitude.”39 Tocqueville seems to be suggesting that religion is 
necessary for political liberty. As mentioned before, freedom is guided by 
religion.
Citizens who don’t have the same moral vocabulary can’t speak to one 
another; they operate in different moral universes. And if they can’t speak to
one another, they can’t deliberate on political issues, let alone even 
understand the moral dictum they employ. Tocqueville’s argument gestures 
to us that a united or fixed morality is the basis for freedom. Political 
freedom rests upon a populace’s faith in their ability to direct their own 
concerns about social, economic, and public matters. This confidence is 
stirred by a vision that self-government is a capable, obtainable task, which 
in turn is brought about by common ideas and beliefs. Thus, the authority 
that is given to a populace by religion structures the very interactions they 
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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have in daily life. Should religion stop taking influence in political life, then 
individuals are weakened, even frightened. Tocqueville writes:
When authority in the matter of religion no longer exists, nor in the 
matter of politics, men are soon frightened at the aspect of this 
limitless independence. This perpetual agitation of all things makes 
them restive and fatigues them. As everything is moving the world of 
the intellect, they want at least that all be firm and stable in the 
material order.40
What may we infer from Tocqueville’s reasoning? One interpretation 
may claim that what Tocqueville is arguing here is that there exists a natural
desire for limits, stability, and order in the human individual. Tocqueville’s 
concern that the ‘agitation of all things’ frightens men may demonstrate that
individuals do not want complete and absolute freedom. What happens when
religion is lost and morality is muddled? Can the power to self-govern still be 
exercised? It may seem like Tocqueville would respond in a negative light, 
for if these state of affairs did ensue, then men would find it frightening. 
Should they occur, I think Tocqueville would comment that man would find 
alternatives.
From the passages looked at so far, it seems very difficult to separate 
freedom and religion from one other. “As for me,” Tocqueville continues, “I 
doubt that man can ever support a complete religious independence and an 
entire political freedom at once.”41 He concludes, “I am brought to think that 
if he has no faith, he must serve, and if he is free, he must believe.”42 So long
as political freedom—freedom to self-govern—exists, a people must continue
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 419.
42 Ibid.
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to forge common values, beliefs, and principles that underlie what can be 
called the “social fabric.” Remember that Tocqueville is interested in 
religion’s utility more so than he cares about its doctrinal content. 
Nevertheless, Tocqueville mentions that, “[r]eligious peoples are therefore 
naturally strong in precisely the spot where democratic peoples are weak; 
this makes very visible how important it is that men keep their religion when 
becoming equal.”43 What is needed in a democracy is the strength given to it
by religion when weakness enters via equality. This strength unifies 
individuals toward a common view of morality, along with bolstering an 
atmosphere of trust, stability, and order.
There is yet a third function that religion serves for Tocqueville: it 
directs our political efforts toward some conception of the good. One 
conception of the good is the idea that political life ought to be focused on 
communal deliberation; that is to say that politics must be concerned with 
upholding certain virtues, values, and norms.44 In doing so, political life 
becomes the search for the good. We turn to this point next.
Function III: Religion as the Source of Mores and The Good
Now that we have talked briefly about the relationship between 
freedom and religion, let’s turn our attention to the relationship between 
mores and religion. To see how Tocqueville understands religion, one must 
look to his view of mores. For in democracy in America, he first treats religion
43 Ibid.
44 This conception is usually contrasted with the liberal notion of politics, which asserts that
political life ought to be structured in such a way that it allows individuals to pursue their 
own vision..
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as the most important for mores. Mores may help clarify a vision of the good 
through facilitating how it should be sought. Mores are defined as the whole 
moral and intellectual state of a people. They are a peoples social and 
cultural conventions and norms. In effect, mores are the manifestations of 
the overall character of the American people. Mores can find their source in 
religion, and it is religion that directs and regulates them.45 Tocqueville 
states:
I understand here the expression moeurs in the sense the ancients 
attached to the word mores; not only do I apply it to mores properly 
so-called, which one could call habits of the heart, but to the different 
notions that men possess, to the various opinions that are current in 
their midst, and to the sum of ideas which the habits of the mind are 
formed.46
For democracy to work well, Tocqueville asserts that individuals must 
develop what he coined the ‘art of associating.’ This ‘art of associating’ relies
on attachments to small communities, which instill forms of recognition that 
are indispensable to a well-functioning, healthy democracy. They are what 
cure the undesirable effects that are unleashed by individualism. Tocqueville 
states:
When citizens are forced to be occupied with public affairs, they are 
necessarily drawn from the midst of their individual interests, and from
time to time, torn away from the sight of themselves.47
Occupation with public affairs create certain small communities, which 
alternatively are called voluntary associations. They were, for Tocqueville, 
organizations such as the American Temperance Society, whose purpose was
45 Ibid., 278.
46 Ibid., 275.
47 Ibid., 486.
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a moral one: to outlaw the sale and consumption of alcohol. This moral 
component, as demonstrated by the American Temperance Society, need 
not be focused solely on individualized, private interest.48 By focusing 
attention away from the individual’s own sphere, these voluntary 
associations connect the individual to something much larger than himself. 
In practice, this looks like what people do in local politics together, 
collectively, to solve their own problems without reliance from some outside 
entity. Thus, political freedom uses voluntary associations to foster some 
notion of what is best for the political community, some conception of the 
good:
There is nothing, according to me, that deserves more to attract our 
regard than the intellectual and moral associations of America … In 
order that men remain civilized or become so, the art of associating 
must be developed and perfected among them in the same ratio as 
equality of conditions increases.49
These associations help civilize men, by perfecting the practice of 
coming together, reflecting, and acting upon an order of politics. Working 
together counters despotism, in Tocqueville’s estimation, and so these 
associations are “schools of freedom.” They help overcome self-interest. In 
fact, they may even be called the “schoolhouses of democracy.”
Under despotism, in contrast, “each of them, withdrawn and apart, is 
like a stranger to the destiny of all the others: his children and his particular 
friends form the whole human species for him; as for dwelling with his fellow 
48 This does not mean that all associations as such need to have a moral component, but 
they may, as demonstrated here.
49 Ibid., 492.
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citizens, he is beside them, but he does not see them … he exists only in 
himself and for himself alone.”50
This dismal description, painted by Tocqueville, is what happens when 
unregulated self-interest takes hold. Nevertheless, voluntary associations 
counter narrow self-interest, by redirecting the self toward the community.
The way in which these voluntary associations manifest themselves in 
political life shed light on how we understand their place in Tocqueville’s 
theory of democracy. Tocqueville describes their function in the American 
people in the following way:
… he defends the growing prosperity of his district, his right to direct 
affairs within it… all things that ordinarily touch men more than the 
general interests of the country and the glory of the nation.51
Notice the autonomy that is given to the local inhabitant of a 
community. The ability to defend, direct, and shape one’s community is a 
testament to the state of affairs that is brought out by an atmosphere that 
cultivates civic participation. It resembles the priority to politics concerned 
with a conception of the good.
 Recall that mores, according to Tocqueville, refer to the attitudes, 
characteristics, customs, and traditions that define a community. A 
community builds itself on shared understandings and a common narrative 
on what right and wrong mean, who the people that make it are, what values
should they uphold, and for what reasons so. It was in America that 
Tocqueville saw this vision of a community played out best. He writes:
50 Ibid., 663.
51 Ibid., 153.
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The American has always seen before his eyes order and public 
prosperity linked to one another and marching in the same step; he 
does not imagine that they can live separately: he therefore has 
nothing to forget and will not lose…52 
That politics must be concerned with public prosperity is driven by a 
concern to live not ‘separately,’ but together. It fortifies a politic that is built 
on the good. For the good to be pursued, individuals must believe that there 
exists a good to be discovered in the first place. That there is something of 
value, worth, and usefulness in inquiring about, in the words of Aristotle, the 
nature of the good life is what Tocqueville sees at work in America. Politics 
ought to be considered as the pursuit of the good, where the conditions to 
pursue that good are facilitated by religion. The work that religion does here 
then is to organize how the good is sought. Because we need shared habits 
and beliefs to inquire about the good, Tocqueville calls religion the first 
political institution. It is the foundation for such a vision of politics. It gives 
citizens the same moral vocabulary to talk to one another, and in doing so, 
“prevents them from conceiving everything and forbids them to dare 
everything.”53
Tocqueville’s belief that mores and the ability to practice politics about
the good derive from religion have numerous implications for how we think 
about democracy today. This is where we turn last.
Contemporary Thoughts
52 Ibid., 274.
53 Ibid., 280.
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Let us recapitulate the train of Tocqueville’s thought as understood 
with respect to religion and democracy. Tocqueville’s theory of democracy—
how religion and political freedom go hand in hand—paints our reading of 
American democracy in the present age with a challenge. Ultimately, there 
exists no ready-to-go solution we can use to correct the dangers unleashed 
in a democratic world. One danger that Tocqueville signaled to us was that of
rampant individualism. Even today, this worry is massified and codified in an 
economic system that is committed to free competition and enterprise. I 
wonder: Would this even be a worry for Tocqueville? Perhaps what he 
encountered in America was of a similar type like the one we see today. He 
observes:
I did not encounter a citizen in America so poor that he did not cast a 
glance of hope and longing on the enjoyments of the rich and whose 
imagination was not seized in advance by the goods that was 
obstinately refusing him.54
What is seen here is the desire for the ‘longing on the enjoyments of 
the rich.’ Moreover, Tocqueville holds that the American mind is set on this 
material life. Is this a testament of human nature, or is it simply something 
Tocqueville noticed in his time?  He analyzes the ways in which American 
democracy has fetishized material well-being:
When, on the contrary, ranks are confused and privileges destroyed, 
when patrimonies are divided and enlightenment and freedom are 
spread, the longing to acquire well-being 
presents itself to the imagination of the poor man, and the fear of 
losing it, to the mind of the rich.55
54 Ibid., 507.
55 Ibid.
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Tocqueville employs the same ‘ranks are confused’ diction once again, 
perhaps as a way to emphasize the undesirable consequences brought about
by democracy. According to Tocqueville, “what attaches the heart most 
keenly is not the peaceful possession of a precious object, but the 
imperfectly satisfied desire to possess it and the incessant fear of losing it.”56
What Tocqueville’s insight may tell us is that the desire for material-well 
being is driven by possession and fear. How one may extend this reasoning 
here in the modern age is by examining the economic realities that fortify 
and intensify these conditions. Maybe this isn’t a problem, maybe it is. In any
case, it is well worth studying how Tocqueville understood this, and how he 
would understand this today.
Another application of Tocqueville’s theory may be in looking at how 
the good is to be pursued in an age where the right is prioritized. Given the 
basic principle that roots Western liberalism, which asserts that the state be 
neutral to different conceptions of the good, how can a conception of the 
good be pursued? The liberal state maintains that it must not enforce any 
particular conception of the good. Instead, it leaves space for all conceptions 
to compete against one another. It holds that there is value in allowing each 
person to actualize their conception of the good insofar as they let others do 
so too. Doesn’t this conception of politics sound like a conception of the good
itself?
56 Ibid., 506
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To illustrate this point further, consider the ways in which our political 
institutions attempt to be non-biased toward any one conception of the good,
but utterly fail in doing so. One example seen recently has been the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. In legalizing same-sex marriage, the law, 
in some way, has defined what marriage is.57 How, one may be warranted in 
asking, can this be neutral? Liberalism wants to merely set up the rules for 
pursuing the good. It wants to do this. But it does not.
Imposing the values of some people on others might be a serious 
worry, but the answer to that worry is not to allow a state to decide which 
values can be considered ‘neutral.’ To presuppose that any value is neutral is
to make a normative claim about it. The solution, Tocqueville might remind 
us, is to deliberate on issues pertaining to the good as central parts of our 
political lives—that this is what political life is all about. Tocqueville notes 
that this ability to deliberate stemmed from religion, but must it? We might 
run into another worry, because conflict is surely expected from those who 
find their conception of the good in religion and those who do not. 
Another question we may raise: Where does religion work today in an 
age when secularism is mainstream? What a political community is and what
it stands for must be a—perhaps the—major concern of a democratic people.
Even Tocqueville’s assessment of democracy may prompt us toward a care 
for the social fabric, which at any rate will have to turn us toward religion. It 
doesn’t necessarily need to, but Tocqueville thinks it must. But with the rise 
57 For surely that is one purpose the law serves: it holds a normative claim about political 
life.
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of secularism—in an age where disbelief certainly reigns in the political world
—where can one go?
Tocqueville is quick to remind us that democratic peoples gravitate 
toward skepticism and rationalism. He writes:
One can foresee that democratic peoples will not readily believes in 
divine missions, that they will willingly laugh at new prophets, and that
they will want to find the principal arbiter of their beliefs within the 
limit of humanity, not beyond it.58
What this statement suggests is the skeptic-minded attitude natural to 
the democratic man. What democracy does to religion is to render it less 
important, because democratic men want to lean on their own knowledge. 
Democrats are not as inclined to place their trust in human authority.
But maybe religion is not necessary for democracy to function. Given 
the three functions I outlined in this paper, might we think there is 
something else that can meditate the political and the moral world, ground 
freedom, and give rise to mores and the good? It seems quite difficult to 
conceive of something that could—but maybe there is something else that 
can do religion’s work in a democratic community. What could this be?
Conclusion59
A politics grounded in the multifarious experiences of its people—lives 
that are shared with common purpose, obligations and duties considered to 
be absolutely integral, and with the culture of well-being and mutual 
understanding—can only be realized once a comprehensive vision of the 
58 Ibid., 408.
59 Finally, here is where I synthesize Tocqueville's thought and mine.
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good is sought. This view departs from the traditional liberal conception of 
politics, where the right is prioritized. That the liberal view of politics we all 
inhabit depends for its sustainability and nourishment upon habits, unchosen
obligations, duties, and allegiance: the local community, the weight of 
religion, and the structure offered by the family. These are only a few of the 
many factors that the liberal view of politics neglects and fails to consider 
when building its account. 
In his Democracy in America, Tocqueville begins with a descriptive 
account of the American people—their society, culture, and their 
psychological mannerisms—and extracts from it their mores and their habits 
of everyday life. These become for Tocqueville the dynamic building blocks 
of democratic life for the Americans. Chief among these principles is the 
desire for political freedom, which is to deliberate and to inquire about what 
is the best way to live. Tocqueville knows that this desire to participate in 
political life must rest on solid foundations—about the cultivation of 
community, self-sacrifice, and ultimately freedom. I argued that religion can 
support that foundation, by identifying its three functions in a healthy 
democracy. Surely, Tocqueville’s insight here can be applied in the modern 
age. What Tocqueville offers us, above all, is an analysis about who we are 
as political beings—namely, that we are fragile political creatures. Indeed, a 
theory of democracy that takes that into account is what makes it healthy.
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